Regional Integration and the Neo‑functionalist Model: The

Brexit Narrative by Aje, O. O. & Chidozie, Felix
Vol.:(0123456789)




Regional Integration and the Neo‑functionalist Model: The 
Brexit Narrative
Oluwatobi Aje1  · Felix Chidozie2
Received: 7 June 2018 / Accepted: 18 November 2018 
© Fudan University 2018
Abstract
The socio-economic and political advantages derived as benefits of the integrative 
project have been the justification for most integrative initiatives. This has also made 
regional integration a major phenomenon in international relations, both as a field 
of study and as a sphere of actual relation. Many theories are paraded in scholarly 
circles explaining the rationale and process of the integrative project. However, little 
attention is paid to the fact that, on the continuum of integration, retrogression and 
disengagement is possible as social realities unfold. Using archival research method, 
the work examines the relevance of the neo-functional model in explaining recent 
trends on integration, using Brexit as a case study. It contends that the neo-function-
alist model still holds analytical purchase in approximating contemporary trends of 
integration.
Keywords Brexit · Neo-functionalism · Regional integration · Regional 
disintegration · Spill-over · Spill-back
1 Introduction
The cooperation of nation-states has been accentuated through the penetrating forces 
of globalization. Thus, the topic has spurred critical engagements, eliciting varying 
ideological posturings. Regional integration became compelling after the Second 
World War, as European nations began to recognise the indispensability of coopera-
tion and joint workings to reconcile the general interests and the distinct interests 
of states (Afinotan 2017). The shift to integration was reinforced by the forces of 
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globalization; the resultant interpenetration and interdependency equally accentu-
ated the preference for integration. More so, the commonly cited socio-economic, 
political, and technological benefits of integration have been a major driving force 
and justification for regional integration (Park and Estrada 2010).
The phenomenon of integration is critical to the discipline of International Rela-
tions. It is one of the major concepts scaffolding the framework of international rela-
tions, therefore, scholars have risen to the occasion by providing holistic theoretical 
frameworks that can help explain the why, how, whence and whether of regional 
integration since it appeared in its earliest form in the 1950s. Among such theo-
retical structures laid down by scholars is the neo-functional model, which pertains 
to the primordial enterprise of offering explanations on the purposes, patterns and 
implications of integration, especially within the context of European integration.
Unfortunately, the neo-functional model has come under heavy criticism among 
scholars; some critics posit that the theory lacks the basic qualities expected of any 
social theory and thus dismiss it as obsolete and un-useful in contemporary politi-
cal analysis. However, it is instructive to note that a theory of regional integration 
should offer explanations for regional integration and equally provide insights into 
the dissolution of regional integration. An apt theory of regional integration should 
theorize on both regional integration and disintegration (Vollaard 2008).
In light of scholarly advances made by neo–neo functional scholars, it is impera-
tive to pose this question, is the neo-functionalist model still relevant in contempo-
rary discourse on regional integration? Although no serious commentator on Euro-
pean Union affairs endorses the 1950s definition of neo-functionalism in its entirety; 
that is not to infer that the neo-functionalist model should be dismissed without 
critical examination of contemporary reality (McGowan 2007). Indeed, ‘confronted 
with concerns about a potential collapse of the EU among eminent Euro-politicians, 
political scientists should be able to discuss the question with logical theoretical 
undercurrent (Vollaard 2008). This work seeks to examine the relevance of the neo-
functional model in the exploration of recent trends on integration, using Brexit as a 
case study. This work comprises a background of the study, theoretical framework, a 
review of the Brexit narratives, its theoretical implications, and conclusion.
1.1  Theoretical Framework: Neo‑functionalism
There are distinct theoretical dimensions on regional integration which seek to 
explain the dynamics of cooperation and integration among nation-states, espe-
cially the European integration. One of such theories is the neo-functional theory as 
espoused by Haas (1958), Lindberg (1963), Schmitter (1969) and Rosamond (2005). 
This theory sought to justify the evolving trend of regional integration in Western 
Europe in the early 1950s. It partly emerged to challenge and provide an alternate 
model to the dominant theories of realism and liberalism. ‘Realism’s tendency to 
pose power-centred logic’ on inter-state cooperation was problematic for Haas as 
much as liberal idealism’s pretence that conflict will likely be transcended through 
the Kantian international legal order (Rosamond 2005, p. 4).
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To Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2006, p. 89), the neo-functionalist model ‘is a product 
of the behaviouralist turn in American social sciences’, which focuses on institu-
tional forms, behaviour and process of integration. The neo-functionalist model 
traces its intellectual root to Mitrany’s functionalism.
Functionalism argues that states are under domestic pressure to cooperate with 
other states to establish a functional supranational body on the premise that there 
are some needs that are transnational in nature and could be accessed only through 
transnational means (Peter 2018, p. 4). The neo-functionalist model views function-
alism as naive, and it therefore seeks to offer a more coherent theory of integra-
tion. The neo-functionalists reformulated the basic principles of functionalism to 
reflect established institutions as the basis for integration through the mechanism of 
spill-over.
Neo-functionalism examines the process of evolution of a new political commu-
nity through the voluntary transfer of sovereignty to a joint decision-making insti-
tution or a supranational body. This model posits that the increasing functionality 
of the supranational body elicits the support of the national elite and the public, 
thereby gradually shifting loyalty to the new political community. The driving force 
for regional integration is the existence of a supranational body that seeks to connect 
the economies of independent nations, and consequent to economic interdependence 
and reliance, a spill-over of the integration process into other realms of relations 
becomes inevitable (Laursen 2008; McGowan 2007; Ozen 1998; Vollaard 2008). To 
this extent, the model identified economic contacts and welfare needs as the tangible 
source that fosters constructive inter-state cooperation. The initial decisions to inte-
grate in this sense unintentionally produces ‘economic and political spill-over that 
push regional integration forward’ (McGowan 2007, p. 6).
The spill-over is central to the neo-functionalist arguments. It represents the 
mechanism behind successful integrations, and when the integration process com-
mences, the spill-over through the workings of a functional supranational body 
becomes inevitable and irreversible. To Lindberg, the spill-over denotes the ‘situ-
ation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which 
the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create 
a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth’ (Lindberg 1963, p. 10).
To Gehring (1996, p. 229), the spill-over ‘amounts to a (positive) feedback mech-
anism, stressing the possibility of self-supporting social processes that start mod-
estly, gain dynamics and may over time produce dramatic outcomes’. The idea of 
spill-over as inevitable and irreversible once the integration process begins suggests 
that the logic of integration is somewhat self-sustaining and automatic. Rosamond, 
however, posits that the assumption of the automatic nature of spill-over is ‘neo-
functionalism intellectual error’ (Rosamond 2005, p. 9). This notion of automatic 
spill-over opened the floodgate of criticisms of the neo-functionalist model. The 
slowdown of the integration process in the 1960s and 1970s and De Gaulle empty 
chair politics points at the inherent problems of the notion of spill-over.
Haas regretted the absence of a theory of integration that explains the ascen-
sion and retrogression of the integration process in response to the failure of the 
neo-functionalist theory to capture the social reality of integration in the 1970s and 
unprecedented nationalism (Vollaard 2008). While the spill-over attracted slight 
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revival in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this was not sufficient to debunk criticisms 
of spill-over and neo-functionalism (Rosamond 2005).
Haas agrees that the neo-functionalist model was defective to the extent that it 
did not envisage the basic possibilities of disintegration. He drew attention to the 
potential reasons for disintegration, which he identifies as follows: ‘a lack of Euro-
pean loyalty among the mass public, dissatisfaction with the output of the EU, and 
the lack of an ideological commitment to sustain the transactional contacts’ among 
others (Vollaard 2008, p. 7).
The idea of spill-back captures the dynamics of disintegration, which is charac-
terized by a decline in the integrative process. It reflects the tendency to shun new 
integrative rules or cheat on existing rules. The process begins when states gradually 
withdraw from initial commitments or ‘…from a set of specific obligations’ to the 
extent that ‘rules are no longer regularly enforced or obeyed. The scope of Commu-
nity action and its institutional capacities decrease’ (Lindberg and Scheingold cited 
in Vollaard 2014, p. 3).
With regards to the European community, spill-back could also occur ‘when 
members no longer want to deal with a certain policy issue at the European level’ 
(Vollaard 2008, p. 7) or when member states shun new integrative rules or cheat 
on existing rules. It occurs when there is diminished interest and shift of coalitions 
thereby undermining the commitments that bind the union. Haas posits that the spill-
back process is aided by the lack of loyalty among the masses, dissatisfaction with 
the output of the union; and lack of ideological basis to sustain the union. When the 
unfavourable conditions persist, socio-economic and political policies that reflected 
transnational expressions, ‘will 1 day or another be confronted with national prefer-
ences’ (Vollaard 2008, p. 8).
The disintegration process is not a direct reversal of the integration process; it is 
not the automatic transfer of loyalty from the supranational organization to the state. 
The spill-back process, however, considers the possible transfer of loyalties towards 
‘multi-layered, multifaceted political constructions’ (Vollaard 2008, p. 8). ‘Loyal-
ties, activities and expectations could also be re-directed to other political entities, 
such as sub-national regions’, for example, Transatlantic Trade Union, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) amongst others (Vollaard 2014, p. 3).
The notion of ‘spill-back’ attempts to fill the gaps in the neo-functionalist model 
and lends analytical lens to this approach to explain the complexities of [dis] inte-
gration. The concept of spill-back has attracted the renewed attention of regional 
integration scholars. Philippe Schmitter and Zoe Lefkofridi (2016), bemoan the 
criticisms of neo-functionalism, insisting that the theory is misunderstood and mis-
represented. The narrative of spill-back to explain the potentials of this approach 
is wielded to repudiate the criticisms of the neo-functionalist model (Hooghe and 
Mark 2005; Schmitter and Lefkofridi 2016).
1.2  The Brexit Narrative
The European Union is predicated on the ashes of post-war Europe. The need to 
foster cooperation in the hitherto war-torn region; and the reconciliation agenda of 
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France and Germany led to the Treaty of Paris; the formations of the European Coal 
and Steel Community in 1951 and the European Economic Community in 1957 
(Beddoes 2016). Britain was pre-occupied with her relationship with the Common-
wealth of Nations and America and it was wary of the integration project led by 
Germany and France in the formative years. The British were further discouraged 
at the possible surrender of the country’s sovereignty. As Hugh Gaitskell, the leader 
of the Labour party warned in 1962, membership of the integrative scheme would 
end Britain’s history of greatness that spans 1000 years. The economic turmoil that 
confronted Britain and the increasing benefits of integration led the country to join 
the community in 1973.
Britain’s membership of the union has been evaluated in terms of costs and ben-
efits (Beddoes 2016). The integrative project was perceived as bad news for most 
Britons when inflation level increased to 30% a few months after joining the union. 
The resultant mixed feeling occasioned by this development led Harold Wilson 
to call for a referendum on the continuing membership of the European Union in 
1975 (Sully 2016). While the majority voted to remain in the community, the spec-
tre of Euro-scepticism existed. The conflicting positions on the integration project 
reflected in the disagreements between the European Commission President, Jacques 
Delors in 1988 on the reinforcement of tougher labour and social regulations and 
Margret Thatcher’s hostile reaction that question the excessiveness of the integration 
project (Beddoes 2016).
The foregoing suggests that Britain had been uncomfortable with aspects of the 
integration project for a long time. David Cameron’s Bloomberg speech in January 
2013 expressed his growing concern about the friction between the European Union 
and Britain. He went further to state his plans for a re-negotiation for a favourable 
coalition with the Union and a referendum on its membership. In his words,
It will be a fundamental principle of a future conservative government that 
membership of the European Union depends on the consent of the British 
people… That’s why after the election, we will negotiate a new settlement for 
Britain in Europe, and then ask the British people whether they want to stay 
in the EU on this reformed basis or leave…we will hold that In-Out referen-
dum before the end of 2017 and respect the outcome (Cameron cited in Brown 
2015, p. 3).
The Cameron speech offered insight into the attitude of a fraction of its politi-
cal class to the union and the contestations in the British society on the integration 
question. Political and civil society groups emerged to campaign for and against the 
notion that Britain should exit the European Union. The key groups, which actively 
contested the motion for and against includes Vote Leave, Leave-EU, and the Labour 
Leave as the major Pro-Brexit camp; and Britain Stronger in Europe, Labour In, and 
the British Influence as campaigners for Bremain (Brown 2015).
The Vote Leave led by Matthew Elliot and other Eurosceptic business gurus 
argued that socio-political, technological and economic forces are undergoing a 
reconfiguration, which the EU cannot cope with and the membership of EU has 
hitherto affected the socio-economic stands of Britain. The sceptics insisted that 
Britain has lost control of vital and strategic policies, and to this extent, a vote to 
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leave the European Union implied a vote for a stronger and reliable Britain. The 
Eurosceptics posited that ‘We should negotiate a new UK–EU deal based on free 
trade and friendly cooperation. We end the supremacy of EU law. We regain control. 
We stop sending £350 million every week to Brussels and instead spend it on our 
priorities.’ It is safer and reasonable to cease transferring power and resources to 
Brussels annually, the group insisted (Brown 2015, 4).
Leave-EU led by Arron Banks and Richard Tice shared the view of the Vote 
Leave; that the annual contribution to Brussels created trade imbalance and eco-
nomic disparity. The Leave-EU campaigners insisted that common trade and migra-
tion rules have diminished the influence of Britain on the world stage. This sub-
group argues thus:
Imagine having £1000 more to spend each year…imagine not having our laws 
dictated to us by Brussels… imagine how we could then regain control of 
important issues such as borders…imagine having greater influence over our 
global trade, so that we can do our deals with fast-growing Commonwealth 
countries and with America… imagine the sense of pride we would get from 
negotiating our own global trade deals… it’s time to be a bigger part of the 
world rather than a smaller part of Europe. We believe Britain could do so 
much better outside of the EU (Brown 2015, p. 4).
The Labour Leave led by Kate Hoey and Graham Stringer sought radical means 
to tackle the problems confronting their country by regaining control of certain 
issues and policies.
On the contrary, the Britain Stronger in Europe group argued that Britain is 
stronger, safer and better in Europe as against isolation. This tendency posited that 
the vote to remain in the European Union is a vote for a stronger, better Britain ‘that 
delivers an opportunity for individuals and families, now and in the future’ (Brown 
2015, p. 6). Furthermore, the British Influence group conceded that the European 
Union might not be capable of handling the changing complexities of world politics; 
but a positive coalition and reformation of the EU with other member states could 
transform the Union.
The Labour In group led by Alan Johnson averred that remaining in the European 
Union is decisive for the survival of Britain in contemporary world politics. This 
group submitted that British commerce relies on EU for exports worth 227 billion 
pounds annually, and it enhances Britain’s global influence in the increasingly inter-
dependent world. The core posturing of this stance is the avowal that Britain could 
achieve more by working with Europe than by not working with Europe (Brown 
2015). The contentions among the groups formed the backdrops for the June 23, 
2016 referendum. The turnout for the referendum was 71.8% with about 30 mil-
lion voters. The Leave group won with 52% as against 48% that favoured sustaining 
British membership of the European Union (Hunt and Wheeler 2016). The results 
reflect regional and generational variations, with the younger generation voting in 
support of Bremain and the older generation in favour of Brexit (BBC 2016). The 
somewhat tight margin of the referendum results pointed at the intensely contested 
nature of the debate on the Brexit question. It is noteworthy that the decision to exit 
the European Union was not predicated on the overwhelming votes of the British 
1 3
Chinese Political Science Review 
populace. This suggests that the prevalent mood could change depending on new 
forces and realities across regions and generations. This paper notes that the fate 
of Britain following Post-Brexit is still attracting debates, and the subject matters 
include the parameters of exiting the European Union.
1.3  Why Brexit? Theoretical Reflections
The outcome of the referendum validated the spill-back aspect of the neo-function-
alist model. Brexit, therefore, suggests that retrogression in the integrative process is 
possible; that actors can, and do withdraw support from supranational institutions. 
Meanwhile, Schmitter and Lefkofridi (2016) posit that support for transnational 
institutions will evolve when the economic benefit of integration is directly felt by 
the majority of the citizens in the member states. Beneficiaries of the integration 
process will likely seek to preserve and offer support to the supranational institution 
depending on the magnitude of benefits.
In retrospect, the debate on Brexit is unending. This debate has been centred on 
the accruable benefits of the membership of the European Union. The economic cost 
and benefit of Britain’s membership of the European Union has been a major issue 
underlying the debates on Brexit/Bremain. Hindley and Howe (2001) had predicted 
the decisive role of economic cost and benefit to the decision of Britain to quit the 
European Union. They assert:
If membership of the European Union is indeed essential to Britain’s eco-
nomic well-being, then going along with developments of the European Union 
even though they are politically undesirable might seem the lesser of two evils. 
On the other hand, if the net economic benefits of Britain’s membership are 
modest, neutral or even negative, then Britain can afford to be far more robust. 
It might then, for example, feel far less inhibited in vetoing political develop-
ments of the EU which it does not like, or at least in pressing for exclusion 
from them and possibly for a special status outside an “Inner-Core” of more 
federally committed member state (Hindley and Howe 2001, p. 34).
To Beddoes (2016, p. 9), British citizens that were unsure of their position on 
Brexit decided at the referendum on the basis of whether leaving the ‘EU is likely to 
make them better or worse off’. There is the argument, however, of the Bank of Eng-
land that membership of the Union has boosted the British economy. Brexit cam-
paigners, however, argued that the country’s membership of the European Union has 
been damaging to its economic, political and historical fortunes. This group cited 
trade imbalance, which negatively affected the British economy as a result of British 
exports totalling 45% to other EU countries; while EU total exports to Britain came 
to 7% (Beddoes 2016).
The Pro-Brexit side insisted that aligning with other multi-layered transnational 
institutions might be favourable; and it preferred reliance on the World Trade Organ-
isation rules and free trade deal with Canada, the US and the Commonwealth. Anti-
Brexit groups argued that the Pro-Brexit stance is unsound and illogical considering 
the prevalence of intergovernmental cooperation on the global scene. This tendency 
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insisted that the proposed integrative scheme with other countries outside Europe 
might not yield the expected output as would the European Union, which has over 
500 million consumers as against Britain’s 65 million people. Interestingly, the Pro-
Brexit campaigners argue that the integrative project amid free movement turned 
Britain into a vulnerable state, where the likelihood of terrorism and other crimi-
nal activities is higher. These problems are attributed to the increasing integrative 
mission of the European Union, and the Pro-Brexit group argue that ‘Britain has 
lost control of its borders… or they point to the European refugee mess’ (Beddoes 
2016, p. 6) as symptoms of negative integration. The rising number of migrants is 
perceived to be partly responsible for unemployment and migrants are viewed as 
competing for welfare packages of the state. As shown in Fig. 1, the attitude of Brit-
ish citizens to immigrants bothers on welfare chauvinism and economic nationalism 
with the latter assuming predominance since 2013. These issues are perceived as 
threats to the economic and socio-political survival of Britain, hence the call to exit 
the Union, as endorsed by the majority of the populace.
It is pertinent to mention that although some firms and individuals support Bre-
main; the majority favours its exit. The neo-functionalists posit that the beneficiaries 
of the integrative process will likely offer support for its maintenance and survival. 
The non-direct beneficiaries will likely oppose and probably withdraw support to 
the institution. Neo-functionalism avers that it is advantageous that the integrative 
scheme directly benefits the majority of the populace of the member state to con-
tinually elicit support.
As seen in Fig.  2, the car industry in Britain, for example, benefits greatly 
from the integrative project and the majority of the car industry workers prefer 
that the country remains in the scheme. Tech UK, an IT Company, and the EEF 
Manufacturers Association had over 60% votes in the polls that support Brit-
ain’s continued membership of the European Union. The United Kingdom arm 
of the International Chamber of Commerce found that over 80% of the interna-
tional businesses domiciled in Britain supported Bremain rather than Brexit. The 
Fig. 1   Source: https ://www.newst atesm an.com/polit ics/2015/01/how-has-press -cover age-immig ratio 
n-chang ed
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Aerospace and Defence association with diverse universities in the UK, as well as 
the Food and Drink Federation, found reasons to support Bremain. James Dyson, 
of the eponymous manufacturing firm, and Alan Halsall of Silver Cross, however, 
rejected Bremain arguing that European Union rules hamper the export of Brit-
ish products. Furthermore, many other small firms insist that, since they do not 
export at all, should be exempted from the Brussel’s rules (Beddoes 2016, p. 10).
There is the argument that a Post-Brexit Britain would be less safe and inse-
cure since the common foreign policy and security strategies, which are jointly 
designed through the decades, increased Britain’s dependence on the European 
Union. However, Brexit apologists counter that NATO is a reliable replacement 
and formidable alliance on security issues. The link of Britain to the five eyes 
(America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Britain) is considered sufficient 
for intelligence gathering (Beddoes 2016, p. 13).
The conflict arising from the integrative process and the expansionist reach 
of the European Union resulted in its politicisation and heightened by the public 
perception. The public perception had been decisive for the sustenance of Brit-
ain’s membership in the European Union. The Pro-Brexit perspective is captured 
thus:
Those in favour of European Integration seem able to sustain a belief in 
large economic benefits without any supporting evidence at all, and in the 
face of mounting contrary evidence… the claim that the benefits are large 
plays an important role in Pro-integration arguments. But when challenged 
about the basis of this claim they all too often merely re-affirm their belief—
their faith—that the economic gains must be large. They do not point to a 
Fig. 2   Source: Economist (https ://www.econo mist.com/sites /defau lt/files /image cache /640-width /image 
s/2016/04/artic les/body/20160 416_BRC08 1.png)
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mass of serious and respectable studies underpinning that conclusion. They 
cannot. There are none (Hindley and Howe 2001, p. 24).
The preceding arguments suggest that Pro-Brexiteers are not concerned about 
the theoretical merits of integration, but rather, they are concerned with facts. 
They are concerned with the ‘concrete problems of European integration and 
their effects on British politics and society’ (Munch 2010), the germane question 
of decreasing sovereignty of the national parliament, the acceptance of Euro, the 
loss of individual self-determination to European regulation scheme, among oth-
ers (Munch 2010).
The majority of the populace perceived that the European Union has failed to 
foster socio-political and economic convergence among European nations. The 
integrative project is criticised for offering greater advantage to Germany, while 
other states are increasingly peripheral. It was argued that Britain has lost its 
identity, glorious historical past, and was assuming the status of a minor power. 
The perceived dysfunctional nature of the European Union and the perceived 
laxness of its institutions to resolve the discrepancies influenced the decision to 
withdraw support from the Union.
The integrative project will likely suffer regression, as states begin to query 
aspects of the integration process. The German Finance Ministry has cautioned 
that Brexit could lead to new attitudes to the integration project in France, The 
Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Hungary ‘in a rash of anti-Brussels rebellions’ 
(Squires 2016). The shift of loyalty would likely be averted or mediated when the 
supranational institution reflects the preferences of the majority of the population 
in these states and allows for variations among the constituting states to safeguard 
strategic national interests.
1.4  Conclusion
The paper identified perspectives on regional integration; it also reiterated the 
need for a theory of regional integration that considers the possibilities of ret-
rogression in the integrative project. While neo-functionalism as a theory of 
regional integration has been heavily criticised, the concept of spill-back and 
the reformation of this theory by Schmitter and other neo-functionalists not only 
improved its capability to explain regional integration, but also improved its ‘ana-
lytical purchase as a [mid-range] theory that is applicable to the dynamics and 
development’ of integration (McGowan 2007, p. 4). The arguments of Pro-Brex-
iters validated the neo-functional theory as a valid theory of regional integration. 
The paper asserted that the dysfunctional and unpopular nature of supranational 
organization would likely attract spill-back. To this extent, the integration process 
fluctuates between integration and disintegration, depending on certain conditions 
which have been highlighted in this study. The ‘spill-over to spill-back’ concept 
explains likely fluctuating trends in integrating societies. The neo-functionalist 
theory remains relevant in capturing the dynamics of the integrative project.
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